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ABSTRACT
Recent years have witnessed a change in focus from considerations of factors which could impede 
competition, for example over-regulation, to the need to strike a balance between over-regulation 
and insufficient regulation – in order to provide the right level of safety for consumers (such that 
they are protected from risky investments). A driving force behind the need for deregulation over 
the  past  two  decades  has  been  the  objective  and  desire  to  foster  competition.  Re-regulation 
thereafter assumed centre stage in some jurisdictions in response to the need to manage cross sector 
services' risks more efficiently.  Rescue cases involving guarantees (contrasted with restructuring 
cases) during the recent Financial Crisis, have illustrated the prominent position which the goal of 
promoting  financial  stability  has  assumed over  that  of  the  prevention  or  limitation  of  possible 
distortions of competition which may arise when granting State aid. 
The importance attached to maintaining and promoting financial stability - as well as the need to 
facilitate  rescue  and restructuring  measures  aimed  at  preventing  systemically  relevant  financial 
institutions from failure, demonstrate how far authorities are willing to overlook certain competition 
policies. However increased government and central bank intervention also simultaneously trigger 
the usual concerns – which include moral hazard and the danger of serving as long term substitutes 
for market discipline. 
An interesting observation derives from the relationship between State aid grants, competition, and 
the potential to induce higher risk taking levels. Whilst the need to promote and maintain financial 
stability is paramount, safeguards need to be implemented and enforced to ensure that measures 
geared  towards  the  aim  of  sustaining  system stability  (measures  such  as  lender  of  last  resort 
arrangements and State rescues) do not unduly distort competition as well as induce higher risk 
taking  levels.  This  paper  will  draw  attention  to  safeguards  which  have  been  provided  by  the 
Commission where approval is considered for the grant of State aid to financial institutions whose 
problems are attributable to inefficiencies, poor asset liability management or risky strategies.
Whether  the  distinction  drawn by the  Commission  –  with  regards  to  the  preferential  grant  of 
recapitalisation  packages  to  fundamentally  sound  banks  (which  require  less  restructuring 
measures)is justified, will also be considered.
How far central banks and governments should intervene and how far distortions of competition 
should be permitted ultimately depends on how systemically relevant a financial institution is.
Key  Words:  Competition,  central  banks,  recapitalisation,  stability,  regulation,  financial  crises, 
fundamentally sound financial institutions
The  Role  of  Central  Banks  and  Competition  Policies  in  the  Rescue  and 
Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions During (and in the Aftermath of) the 
Financial Crisis 
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
It is argued that competition assessments – whether carried out only by the competition authority or 
in  conjunction with the financial  sector  regulator,  are  vital  for  state  aid  applications  and many 
emergency measures which may have been established by governments.2 Whether new regulatory 
procedures which are to be introduced will facilitate “meaningful competition assessments” to be 
made within the available time period during times of crises, constitutes a topic of controversial 
dimensions and such controversy is also acknowledged.3
Up till the 1980s, it was widely acknowledged that competition contributed to the deterioration of 
financial stability – intense competition was particularly considered to favour excessive levels of 
risk taking – hence contributing to higher risks of individual bank failures.4 However it has been 
recently observed that “panic runs can occur independently of the degree of competition in the 
market.”5
Other views regarding contributory factors to financial crises and particularly financial instability, 
embrace criticisms of the monetary policies established by central banks. The standard argument 
advanced by critics of monetary policies during past financial crises, relates to the fact that “interest 
rates were kept too low for too long and that this created for investors, both an incentive and a 
possibility to take excessive risks.”6 A further criticism of monetary policy is attributed to the fact 
that investors are encouraged to believe that monetary policies will always bail them out in times of 
financial difficulties.7
Whilst the need to promote and maintain financial stability is paramount, safeguards need to be 
implemented and enforced to ensure that measures geared towards the aim of sustaining system 
stability (measures such as lender of last  resort  arrangements and State rescues) do not unduly 
distort competition as well as induce higher risk taking levels. This paper will draw attention to 
safeguards which have been provided by the Commission where approval is considered for the 
grant of State aid to financial institutions whose problems are attributable to inefficiencies, poor 
asset liability management or risky strategies. Under its predecessor paper,8 safeguards which are in 
1Researcher Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP) University of Bremen, and Teaching Associate, Oxford 
Brookes University.
2 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Markets: Key Findings” 
(2009) at page 10 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/22/43067294.pdf>
3 ibid
4 See ibid at page 26
5 ibid
6 C Noyer, “Central Banks in the Financial Crisis” Bank for International Settlements Publications 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r090710a.pdf>
7 Since „central banks would not lean against bubbles but have been prepared to clean up the consequences after they 
burst.” See ibid
8Please particularly refer to section four of the paper (by the author) “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State 
Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich RePEc and SSRN Working Papers
place to ensure that competition is not distorted were considered under section four of the paper. 
Such safeguards,  as considered in the paper,  are  applicable  both to financial  institutions whose 
viability problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme conditions which prevail in 
the financial market), as well as those financial institutions whose endogenous problems are related 
to inefficiency or excessive risk- taking. The paper also considered the rationale for the distinction 
between these institutions and concluded that financial institutions whose problems are attributable 
to inefficiencies, poor asset liability management or risky strategies should be accorded the same 
treatment as those whose viability problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme 
conditions  which  prevail  in  the  financial  market)  as  far  as  such  „non  fundamentally  sound“ 
institutions are considered to be systemically relevant.
Whether  the  distinction  drawn by the  Commission  –  with  regards  to  the  preferential  grant  of 
recapitalisation packages to fundamentally sound banks (which require less restructuring measures) 
is justified will be considered.
This paper is structured as follows: Under the second section, prominence is given to highlighting 
the distinction between fundamentally sound financial institutions and those not considered to be 
fundamentally  sound.  In  this  respect,  the  preferential  grant  of  recapitalisation  schemes  to 
fundamentally sound financial institutions will be emphasised. The third section will then consider 
measures  which  have  been  established  as  means  of  minimising  and  avoiding  distortions  of 
competition. The third section will also consider the extent to which the objective of promoting 
financial  stability should override that  of the need to minimise distortions  of competition.  This 
section is structured into four parts: 
I. Safeguards Against Possible Distortions of Competition in Recapitalisation Schemes
II. Prevention and Limitation of Undue Distortions of Competition.
III. Exit Strategies to Address Distortions to Competition Instituted by Crisis Responses
IV. Recapitalisation  Schemes  in  Respect  of  Non  Fundamentally  Sound  Institutions  and  the 
Grant  of State  Capital:  The Objective of Fostering Competition Overriding the Need to 
Promote Financial Stability?
The fourth section will  then consider the reasons behind the increasing prominence of the role 
assumed by central banks in regulation – in their capacities as regulator, monetary policy setters and 
lender of last resort providers. Such a consideration will be facilitated through an overview of the 
impact of the recent Financial Crisis.
Should  lender  of  last  resort  arrangements  be  granted  to  a  wider  extent  under  complementary 
arrangements which support recapitalisation schemes than those which support guarantee schemes 
or  vice  versa?What  are  the  benefits  of  expanding  the  role  of  central  banks  as  opposed to  the 
disadvantages of increased central bank intervention in rescues? These are amongst several points 
to be deliberated on in this section before a conclusion is drawn in the fifth and final section of the 
paper.
B. Recapitalisation Schemes
Guarantee schemes could be distinguished from recapitalisation schemes in that  recapitalisation 
schemes  are  generally  used  in  collaboration  with  financial  institutions  that  are  “fundamentally 
sound but which may experience  distress because of extreme conditions in financial  markets.”9 
However, the Recapitalisation Communication also makes provision for banks which are not so 
fundamentally sound.10
The objective being the provision of public funds in order “to consolidate the capital base of the 
financial institutions directly or to facilitate the injection of private capital by other means, so as to 
prevent negative systemic spill overs.”11
Under section 2 paragraph 14 of the Banking Communication, distortions of competition resulting 
from schemes supporting the viability of institutions which are illiquid but otherwise fundamentally 
sound, will normally be more limited and require less substantial restructuring than those financial 
institutions which are particularly affected by losses stemming for instance from inefficiencies, poor 
asset-liability management or risky strategies. In the paper preceding this,12 the justification for the 
grant  of  State  aid  to  institutions  whose  losses  result  from  inefficiencies,  poor  asset-liability 
management  or  risky  strategies  was  considered.  Furthermore,  the  grant  of  State  aid  to  such 
institutions  was  justified  on  the  basis  that  systemic  relevant  institutions  within  this  category13, 
whose failure pose such disastrous consequences for financial stability, should not be allowed to 
fail. 
With respect to purposes which the recapitalisation of banks could serve, three common objectives 
are listed in the Commission’s Communication 14 and these are as follows:
- Contribution  to  the  restoration  of  financial  stability  as  well  as  the  restoration  of  the 
confidence needed for the recovery of inter-bank lending. Further, additional capital serves 
as a cushion during periods of recession by absorbing losses and reducing the likelihood and 
risk of banks becoming insolvent.15
9 Recapitalisation schemes constitute a “second systemic measure in response to the recent financial crisis to be used to 
support  financial  institutions  that  are fundamentally sound but  which  may experience distress  because  of  extreme 
conditions in financial markets.” See Banking Communication Section 4 paragraph 34 of the “Communication from the 
Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of 
the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 270/02) at page 5
10See Section 2.3 paragraph 43 of the Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions 
in  the  current  financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of 
competition - which states that the recapitalisation of banks which are not fundamentally sound should be subject to 
stricter requirements. Furthermore, paragraph 44 states that 
“As far as remuneration is concerned, it should in principle reflect the risk profile of the beneficiary and be higher 
than for fundamentally sound banks. This is without prejudice to the possibility for supervisory authorities to take urgent 
action where necessary in cases of restructuring.”
11 See section 4 paragraph 34 of the Banking Communication
12M Ojo, “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich RePEc and 
SSRN Working Papers
13 Category of institutions whose losses result from inefficiencies, poor asset-liability management or risky strategies.
14 See paragraph 4 of the Communication from the Commission  —  The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the 
current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition
15 ibid
- Facilitating lending to the real economy16
- State recapitalisation could also serve to address and rectify insolvency problems faced by 
financial institutions – such problems having arisen as a result of such institutions’ particular 
business model or investment strategy.17
In  respect  of  this  third  objective  (for  which  the  recapitalisation  of  banks  could  serve),  it  is 
interesting to note that Paragraph 6 of the Recapitalisation Communication, provides for “problems 
of  financial  institutions  facing  insolvency  as  a  result  of  their  particular  business  model  or 
investment strategy“ - given the fact that paragraphs 4 and 5 explicitly provide for fundamentally 
sound financial institutions. Whilst paragraph 4 interalia  states that „additional capital provides a 
cushion in recessionary times to absorb losses and limits the risk of banks becoming insolvent“, 
paragraph 5 recognises that fundamentally sound banks may prefer to restrict lending in order to 
avoid risk and maintain higher capital ratios.
According to paragraph 6 of the Recapitalisation Communication, „a capital injection from public 
sources  providing emergency support  to  an individual  bank may also help to  avoid short  term 
systemic effects of its possible insolvency. In the longer term, recapitalisation could support efforts 
to prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its  orderly winding-up.“ 
Against the back drop of this exceptional provision, a case relating to the grant of capital injections 
for a non fundamentally sound financial institution will be considered.
Hypo Real Estate (HRE) – Capital Injections
„In  April  2010,  the  German  Financial  Markets  Stabilisation  Fund  (SoFFin)  approved  the  next 
recapitalisation tranches of up to €1.85 billion for Hypo Real Estate Holding AG (HRE), within the 
framework of the existing capital plan. It is planned that this capital be paid into HRE's capital 
reserve in at least two tranches as necessary. In particular, the recapitalisation is necessary in order 
for DEPFA BANK plc to maintain its minimum regulatory capital ratios in the near future. The 
capital measure is subject to approval by the European Commission. Including the support measure 
at hand, SoFFin has to date, provided total recapitalisation support of around € 7.85 billion to the 
HRE Group.“18
Having regards  to  i)  Article  87(3)(b)  EC Treaty which  enables  the Commission to  declare  aid 
compatible with the Common Market if it is "to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State"; the fact that ii) Germany considered HRE to be a bank with systemic relevance for 
the financial market, iii) BaFin confirmed that the own capital of the bank would fall short of the 
16 “Fundamentally sound banks may prefer to restrict lending in order to avoid risk and maintain higher capital ratios. 
State capital injection may prevent credit supply restrictions and limit the pass-on of the financial markets' difficulties to 
other businesses.” see ibid at paragraph 5. Further, according to paragraph 39 of the Recapitalsation Communication, 
“When Member States use recapitalisation with the objective of financing the real economy, they have to ensure that the aid 
effectively contributes to this. To that end, in accordance with national regulation, they should attach effective and enforceable 
national safeguards to recapitalisation which ensure that the injected capital is used to sustain lending to the real economy.”
17 Furthermore recapitalisation may also respectively serve to address short term and long term systemic effects through 
capital injections from public sources providing emergency support to an individual bank and  “supporting efforts to 
prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its orderly winding-up.“ see ibid at paragraph 6
18See  „SoFFin  passes  resolution  on  €  1.85  billion  recapitalisation  for  HRE“  30  April  2010 
<http://www.hyporealestate.com/eng/pdf/1004recaptranch_e.pdf>  „In 2007, HRE took over the Dublin-based DEPFA 
Bank plc and extended its business to public sector and infrastructure finance. HRE currently consists of the following 
main companies: Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG and DEPFA Bank plc.“ see European 
Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – Germany Hypo Real Estate – 
Extension of Formal Investigation Procedure, and Temporary Find Capital Injections Compatible“ at paragraphs 12 and 
13
regulatory requirements if the bank did not receive further capital and iv) that bank supervisory 
procedures would be initiated if the bank did not receive further capital, the Commission assessed 
the State aid measures for HRE under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.19
„The Commission decided to assess the temporary compatibility of capital measures until a decision 
on the restructuring plan was taken - since Germany had asked for temporary approval of the capital 
measures.  If  the  measures  were  held  to  be  compatible  the  Commission  decided  it  would  not 
consider whether the measures were already compatible under the German rescue aid scheme.“20
Even  though  HRE was  in  the  process  of  restructuring  at  the  time,  and  Germany had  already 
provided  a  restructuring  plan  which  was  subsequently  updated  and was  being  assessed  by the 
Commission at the time, the need to temporarily grant emergency aid prior to the final assessment 
of the revised restructuring plan was acknowledged since financial  stability was at  stake in the 
prevailing case and urgent remedial action was required to keep the ailing bank afloat – this also 
being confirmed by the national financial supervisory authority.21
 In its decision, the Commission decided to temporarily find compatible with the Common Market
the capital injection amounting to EUR 60 million carried out in March 200922, the capital injection 
amounting to EUR 2 959 632 240 carried out in June 2009, and the capital injection amounting to 
EUR 3.0 billion to be carried out in November 2009 in favour of HRE until the Commission has 
taken a final decision on the restructuring plan.23 Furthermore the Commission concluded that the 
capital injections „are appropriate, necessary and proportional, and can be considered compatible 
with the Common Market on a temporary basis until a final decision was taken on the restructuring 
plan of HRE.“24
Such a decision to accord priority to financial stability will be contrasted to other scenarios which 
give more preference to  the need to minimise and avoid distortions of competition in  the next 
section.
19See European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – Germany Hypo 
Real  Estate  –  Extension  of  Formal  Investigation  Procedure,  and  Temporary  Find  Capital  Injections  Compatible“ 
paragraphs 41 and 42, at pages 6 and 7; „The Commission re iterated is doubts on the viability of HRE in its decision 
(Decision C(2009) 5888 final) of 24 July 2009 and the present case, taking into account the more detailed figures in the 
updated restructuring plan and questioning whether the intended restructuring was sufficient to allow restoration of 
long-term viability on the basis of the State aid received and planned.
The Commission also identified three problematic aspects that  could affect  the long-term sustainability of 
HRE's business  model – which it intended to investigate further. The three problematic aspects included:i) Funding, 
ii)Short- and long-term profitability and (iii)the fact that HREindicated in its revised business plan that it wanted to 
remain active in two fields: Commercial Real Estate and Public Finance. Nevertheless, the Commission observed at the 
time that the intended margin in the area of public finance was very low and that market pressure could further reduce 
achievable margins.“ See paragraphs 58 -61;ibid
20See ibid at paragraph 44
21Ibid at paragraph 48
22„With regard to its silent participation of EUR 1 billion, SoFFin was to receive a profit-related coupon of 10 %. This 
level of remuneration was considered to be  in line with paragraph 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication, which 
stipulates  that  where  the  price  cannot  be  set  to  levels  that  correspond  to  the  risk  profile  of  the  bank,  it  would 
nevertheless  need  to  be  close  to  that  required  for  a  similar  bank  under  normal  market  conditions.  Moreover,  the 
Commission highlighted the fact that HRE would not get capital at an economically justifiable remuneration level on 
the market in the current circumstances but that given the fact that HRE was in difficulty, it should pay at least a 
reasonable price - that 10 % was considered to be an acceptable level.“ (See Commission decision of 12 May 2009 in 
case N 615/2008, BayernLB); see paragraph 52; ibid.
23See ibid;section 5 at page 11; „The capital injection of EUR 60 million had only limited scope, resulting in a 8.65% 
share of HRE's equity capital which did not give Germany a major influence on the bank“; see paragraph 49
24Ibid at paragraph 54 
C. Minimising and Avoiding Distortions of Competition
I. Safeguards Against Possible Distortions of Competition in Recapitalisation Schemes.25
As well as highlighting the Banking Communication's emphasis on the need for safeguards aimed at 
preventing and limiting possible distortions of competition in recapitalisation schemes,26 paragraph 
35 of the Recapitalisation Communication also makes mention of the Banking Communication's 
requirement27 that  capital  injections  be limited to the minimum necessary and not  to  allow the 
beneficiary to engage in aggressive commercial strategies which would be incompatible with the 
underlying objectives of recapitalisation. Where higher remuneration is required by the State, there 
will  (as  a  general  principle)  be  less  need  for  safeguards  -  since  the  level  of  price,  in  the 
Commission’s view, will limit distortions of competition.28 
However this can be contrasted with the case involving Hypo Real Estate where in respect of the 
capital  injections  carried out  by acquiring  share  capital  and the  injection into  the reserves,  the 
German authorities highlighted that SoFFin as 100% HRE owner, was entitled to a shareholder's 
usual  remuneration. Furthermore,  it  was  stated  that  „for  a  distressed bank,  no  market-conform 
remuneration can be expected, at least in the short-term,  for such provision of capital and that in 
line with the Recapitalisation Communication, such a situation required a thorough and far-reaching 
restructuring.“29
Safeguards  which  have  been  proposed  as  means  of  preventing  distortions  of  competition  with 
guarantee schemes include restrictions on commercial conducts through for example market share 
ceilings,  limitations  to  the  size  of  the  balance-sheet  of  the  beneficiary  institutions  or  other 
behavioural constraints that may be needed to achieve the purpose of the guarantee.30 Issues which 
are also considered to arise with these safeguards include:31
1) How they can be properly monitored and enforced since financial services are typically not 
regarded as standardized products.
2) The  likelihood  that  some restrictions  such  as  those  on  the  growth  of  undertaking  may 
themselves generate anticompetitive effects in terms of collusive agreements.
25In the Commission's view, „Safeguards may be necessary to prevent aggressive commercial expansion financed by State 
aid. In principle, mergers and acquisitions can constitute a valuable contribution to the consolidation of the banking industry 
with a view to achieving the objectives of stabilising financial  markets  and ensuring a steady flow of credit  to the real  
economy. In order not to privilege those institutions with public support to the detriment of competitors without such support, 
mergers and acquisitions should generally be organised on the basis of a competitive tendering process.” see paragraph 37 of 
the Recapitalisation Communication.
26Paragraph 35 of the Banking Communication
27Paragraph 38 of the Banking Communication
28„Banks receiving State recapitalisation should also avoid advertising it for commercial purposes.” See paragraph 36 of the 
Recapitalisation Communication. (Communication from the Commission  — The recapitalisation of financial institutions in 
the  current  financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum  necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of 
competition )
29See paragraph 53 of European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – 
Germany Hypo Real Estate – Extension of Formal Investigation Procedure, and Temporary Find Capital Injections 
Compatible“
30Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” Organisation for 
Economic  Cooperation and Development  Publications  February 2009 at  page  15.Paper  served  as  the  basis  for  a  
discussion on the financial crisis in the OECD Competition Committee on 17-18 February 2009 and  is published  
under the responsibility of the Secretary General of the OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/24/42538399.pdf>
31ibid
3) Of paramount importance is the concern related to the remuneration of the guarantee scheme 
or any other form of intervention such as the recapitalization schemes. 32
II. Prevention and Limitation of Undue Distortions of Competition
Three  levels  of  possible  distortions  of  competition  are  highlighted  in  the  Commission 
Communication33 on the Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions and these are as follows:34
− First, recapitalisation by one Member State of its own banks should not give those banks an 
undue  competitive  advantage  over  banks  in  other  Member  States.  Access  to  capital  at 
considerably lower rates than competitors from other Member States, in the absence of an 
appropriate  risk-based  justification,  may  have  a  substantial  impact  on  the  competitive 
position of a bank in the wider single European market.35
− Secondly,  recapitalisation  schemes  which  are  open to  all  banks  within  a  Member  State 
without  an  appropriate  degree  of  differentiation between beneficiary banks  according  to 
their  risk  profiles  may give  an  undue advantage  to  distressed  or  less-performing banks 
compared to banks which are fundamentally sound and better-performing.36
− Thirdly, public recapitalisation, in particular its remuneration, should not have the effect of 
putting banks that do not have recourse to public funding, but seek additional capital on the 
market, in a significantly less competitive position.37
In considering whether State aid (and in particular emergency guarantees) was to be granted to 
Hypo Real Estate, the Commission in attempting to ensure that  distortions of competition were 
minimised (as far as possible), considered the Requirement that aid granted “does not exceed what 
is strictly necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose and that distortions of competition are avoided 
or minimized as far as possible” - in line with the general principles which constitute the basis of 
State aid rules of the Treaty, which require that the aid granted “does not exceed what is strictly 
necessary  to  achieve  its  legitimate  purpose  and  that  distortions  of  competition  are  avoided  or 
minimized as far as possible.”38
32„In principle, the remuneration of any type of support such as the issuance of new shares or asset swaps should be 
determined on the basis of a market-oriented valuation and be as close as possible to the market rate. However, at the 
current moment, the pricing mechanism in the markets seems to have stopped working properly. In such a situation, an 
important question is how to explicitly calculate an appropriate remuneration for the public supports in a time when 
markets are so highly illiquid and volatile that market prices may no longer be tied to the value of fundamentals. This 
issue resembles the current de”bate in the application of mark-to-market accounting  standards when markets do not 
work properly.” ibid
33 See paragraphs 7-10 of the Communication from the Commission – „The recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in 
the  Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards Against  Undue Distortions of 
Competition
34See paragraphs 8 -10; ibid
35„ Excessive aid in one Member State could also prompt a subsidy race among Member States and create difficulties for the 
economies of Member States which have not introduced recapitalisation schemes. A coherent and coordinated approach to the 
remuneration of public capital  injections, and to  the other conditions attached to  recapitalisation, is  indispensable to the 
preservation of a level playing field. Unilateral and uncoordinated action in this area may also undermine efforts to restore 
financial stability (‘Ensuring fair competition between Member States’).”
36„ This  will  distort  competition  on  the  market,  distort  incentives,  increase  moral  hazard  and  weaken  the  overall 
competitiveness of European banks (‘Ensuring fair competition between banks’).”
37“A public  scheme  which  crowds  out  market-based  operations  will  frustrate  the  return  to  normal  market  functioning 
(‘Ensuring a return to normal market functioning’).”
38European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency guarantees for Hypo 
III. Exit Strategies to Address Distortions to Competition Instituted by Crisis Responses 
According  to  the  Recapitalisation  Communication,  „recapitalisation  measures  need  to  contain 
appropriate incentives for State capital to be redeemed when the market so allows. The simplest 
way to provide an incentive for banks to look for alternative capital is for Member States to require 
an adequately high remuneration for the State recapitalisation.“39
Furthermore, the Communication states that „if a Member State prefers not to increase the nominal 
rate of remuneration, it may consider increasing the global remuneration through call options or 
other redemption clauses,  or mechanisms that encourage private capital  raising,  for instance by 
linking the payment of dividends to an obligatory remuneration of the State which increases over 
time.“40
In facilitating exit strategies, „member States may also consider using a restrictive dividend policy 
to ensure the temporary character of State intervention.“41
The  OECD's  proposal  is  founded  on  the  distinction  between  the  types  of  aid  provided  for  i) 
financial firms for systemic reasons and ii) for non-financial firms with structural problems. As pre 
requisite for the grant of aid to non financial firms, the requirement that “ structural reforms to a 
sustainable industry structure” exist, was put forward.42
Furthermore, “the need to ensure that structural reforms promote the long-term viability of these 
firms” is considered to constitute part of an exit strategy.43 Other forms of aid considered include:44
• nationalization of financial institutions or non-financial firms;
• state-sponsored capital injections45 
• extended liquidity facilities;
• interbank lending guarantees; and
• state acquisition of so-called “toxic assets”.
Real Estate” 
39See paragraph 31
40See paragraph 32 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
41See paragraph 32 of the Recapitalisation Communication 
42See Organisation for Economic Co operation Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 22
43ibid
44ibid
45„In the European Union, relevant competition decisions have included Commission Decision of 13 October 2008 in 
Case  N  507/08  Financial  Support  Measures  to  the  banking  Industry  in  the  UK  (OJ  C  290,  13.11.2008,  p.  4), 
Commission Decision of 27 October 2008 in Case N 512/08 Support measures for financial institutions in Germany (OJ 
C 293, 15.11.2008, p. 2) and Commission Decision of 19 November 2008 in Case N 560/08 Support measures for the  
credit institutions in Greece, Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 in Case N 528/08 the Netherlands,  Aid to 
ING Groep N.V., Commission Decision of 25 November 2008 in Case NN 68/08 on Latvian State support to JSC Parex 
Banka. Commission Communication of 13 October on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p.8) and European 
Commission principles are outlined in Commission Communication of 5 December on The recapitalization of financial 
institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortion of competition (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009 p.2).” see OECD, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 22
IV. Recapitalisation  Schemes  in  Respect  of  Non  Fundamentally  Sound  Institutions  and  the 
Grant of State Capital: The Objective of Fostering Competition Overriding the Need to Promote 
Financial Stability?
Why should  financial  institutions  whose  problems  are  attributable  to  inefficiencies,  poor  asset 
liability management or risky strategies not be accorded the same treatment as those whose viability 
problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme conditions which prevail  in the 
financial  market)  as  far  as  such  “non  fundamentally  sound”  institutions  are  considered  to  be 
systemically relevant?
Section 2.3 paragraphs  43 and 44 of  the Recapitalisation Communication highlights  safeguards 
which are available where the grant of State capital to non fundamentally sound institutions are 
approved. Banks which would require more far reaching restructuring and which are considered not 
to be fundamentally sound are subject to more stringent requirements than fundamentally sound 
financial institutions (which would require less restructuring). Such stringent requirements include:
− The  requirement  that  remuneration  should  “in  principle  reflect  the  risk  profile  of  the 
beneficiary  and  be  higher  (for  non fundamentally  sound  banks)  than  for  fundamentally 
sound banks - without prejudice to the possibility for supervisory authorities to take urgent 
action where necessary in cases of restructuring.”46
− The acceptability and approval of use of State capital for  non fundamentally sound banks 
being dependent  on the  condition of  either  a  bank's  winding-up or  a  thorough and far-
reaching restructuring, including a change in management and corporate governance where 
appropriate. 47
The Commission in its Communication explicitly states that  „Notwithstanding the need to ensure 
financial  stability,  the  use  of  State  capital  for  these  banks  (non fundamentally  sound financial 
institutions) can only be accepted on the condition of either a bank's winding-up or a thorough and 
far-reaching  restructuring,  including  a  change in  management  and corporate  governance  where 
appropriate.“48
Does this infer that the Commission is prepared to override the paramount objective of financial 
stability  –  by  according  greater  prominence  to  the  goal  of  fostering  competition?  This  might 
initially appear  to  be the case.  As highlighted in  the second section of its  predecessor  paper49, 
financial  institutions  whose  problems  are  attributed  to  “inefficiencies,  poor  asset-liability 
management  or  risky strategies”  and  which  are  considered  to  be  systemically  relevant,  should 
benefit  from state aid where restructuring of such institutions occur – to  the extent that  senior 
management (or indeed the entire management) of those institutions are replaced.
46See paragraph 44 which furthermore adds that “Where the price cannot be set to levels that correspond to the risk profile 
of the bank, it would nevertheless need to be close to that required for a similar bank under normal market conditions. “
47“As a result, either a comprehensive restructuring plan or a liquidation plan will have to be presented for these banks within 
six months of recapitalisation. As indicated in the Banking Communication, such a plan will be assessed according to the 
principles of the rescue and and restructuring guidelines for firms in difficulties,  and will have to include compensatory 
measures.”
48See paragraph 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication. (Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of 
financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition )
49See M Ojo, “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich RePEc and 
SSRN Working Papers
Such  intentional  safeguard  by the  Commission  whilst  ensuring  that  competition  is  not  unduly 
distorted, also serves as a warning to “too big to fail firms” that guaranteed government or central 
bank intervention in the case of impending financial difficulties does not serve as an excuse for 
complacency or reckless risk taking behaviour. Such a move by the Commission is therefore aimed 
at deterring moral hazard whilst fostering competition.
 
D. The Increased Prominence of the Role Assumed by Central Banks – The Impact of the 
Recent Financial Crisis.
According to recent observations, some aspects of the more prominent role which central banks 
have assumed since the recent crisis (such a role being partly attributed to circumstances triggered 
by the recent financial crises), are likely to become more permanent during the aftermath of the 
Crisis.50
Unconventional measures which were introduced by advanced economies in response to the latter 
stages of 2008 include liquidity provision to banks on extra ordinary terms – particularly for longer 
periods  of  maturity,  intervention  in  selected  credit  markets  –  a  measure  aimed  at  supporting 
secondary market  liquidity and the outright  purchase of bonds – such purchase being aimed at 
improving financing conditions beyond that which can be achieved by policy rate cuts.51
A change in  supervisory responsibilities  and functions  of regulators  – with more  powers being 
transferred to central banks, is also being witnessed in jurisdictions such as the UK. This response 
has been prompted by the realisation that the allocation of responsibilities between the tripartite 
arrangement (consisting of the single financial services regulator – the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), the Treasury and the Bank of England) did not function efficiently and timely52 to avert the 
crisis generated during the events leading to the collapse of Northern Rock. Greater powers have 
been transferred to the Bank of England who used to be responsible for bank supervision before this 
role was transferred to the FSA in 1997.
“The Bank of England’s focus on meeting the inflation target” it is contended, “distracted it from 
monitoring other important variables that affect financial stability.”53 In response to some of the 
issues brought to light as a result of the recent crisis, the Bank is now to be given responsibility for 
50 H Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010  Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 1
51 ibid at page 3
52 It is also highlighted that a key reason for the failure of the tripartite system of financial oversight during Northern 
Rock’s collapse was a failure by the tripartite body to properly identify and monitor risks to the financial system as 
whole.  See  Shearman  and  Sterling  LLP,  „UK Government  Proposals  for  Financial  Regulatory Reform“  Financial 
Institutions  Advisory and Financial Regulatory Group Publications 7 June 2010
53 ibid; “Under EU legislation currently being discussed in Brussels, there may in the foreseeable future, be a new 
financial  regulatory  framework  that  aims  to  strengthen  prudential  supervision  across  the  EU.  Macro-prudential 
supervision would be the responsibility of a new European Systemic Risk Board that would, with the assistance of the 
European Central  Bank, be tasked with giving early warning of any growing systemic risks and, where necessary, 
recommending action to deal  with such risks.  Micro-prudential  supervision would be carried out  by the European 
System of Financial Supervisors, made up of national supervisors, and by three European Supervisory Authorities for 
the  banking,  securities  and  insurance  and  occupational  pensions  sectors.  In  order  for  the  new  EU  supervisory 
framework to work properly, the responsibilities of the Bank of England and the FSA would need to correspond with 
those of the new EU institutions and their counterparts in other member states.”
systemic oversight.54 As a result, the grant of further supplementary oversight functions to the Bank 
of England in relation to the associated subject of prudential regulation, it is further argued, will be 
desirable.55 Even though a change in supervisory roles – with respect to present regulator and the 
central bank is also considered to be a possibility in Germany56, a radical change such as that which 
is currently taking place in the UK, is not foreseen. This in partly attributable to the fact that the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, the central bank, was responsible for numerous vital supervisory functions 
and was more engaged in bank supervision – in contrast to the position which existed with the Bank 
of England.
Whilst the need for a greater role for central banks in facilitating financial stability and promoting 
systemic  oversight  is  a  positive  and justified  development,  the  growing intervention  of  central 
banks in financial markets gives rise to concerns. The recent Financial Crisis witnessed a series of 
rescues and restructuring of financial  institutions – such being facilitated by State aids – hence 
government  intervention.  Central  bank  intervention  provides  an  invaluable  source  of  liquidity 
funding in terms timeliness (particularly in view of urgent scenarios) when compared to State aids. 
The  promptness  of  central  banks  in  addressing  serious  liquidity  problems  faced  by  financial 
institutions has contributed to the realisation that its role in promoting financial stability should be 
accorded greater prominence. At the same time, it appears to be widely acknowledged that “the role 
of the lender of last resort facility should not be used to address individual bank insolvencies.”57
The “classic” view – under which it is held that “central banks should lend freely at a penalty rate as 
well as against good collateral”58 is considered to serve as a means of ensuring that :59
- 1) The lender of last resort is only used for illiquid banks 
- 2) In emergency situations
54 Ibid; Furthermore, “central banks are increasingly being put in charge of overseeing systemic risk. This is because, 
as “the ultimate provider of liquidity”,  they are in a unique position to focus on system-wide risks and obtain an 
integrated view of both the individual financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. Even when financial 
institutions  look  strong on  an  individual  basis,  systemic  risk can  emerge  as  a  result  of  the  interconnectedness  of 
financial institutions, markets and infrastructures. The macroprudential approach to supervision has to take account of 
these externalities. 
Two recent examples of this approach are the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) at the 
ECB, and the proposed Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States. The ESRB will be an independent 
body responsible for conducting macroprudential oversight of the European Union’s financial system as a whole. It is 
thus expected to fill a gap in the ability of financial regulators to detect, assess and contain the build-up of systemic 
risks. Similarly,  the Financial Stability Oversight Council of regulators in the United States is expected to identify 
systemically significant companies and monitor markets for the development of asset price and credit booms that might 
threaten  financial  stability.  According  to  these  proposals,  the  Fed  would  be  responsible  for  the supervision  of 
systemically important financial institutions.” see H Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: 
What  are  the  Limits?” June  2010  Bank  for  International Settlements  Publications 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 6
55 See Shearman and Sterling LLP, „UK Government Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform“ Financial Institutions 
Advisory and Financial Regulatory Group Publications 7 June 2010
56 H Hannoun “The Expanding Role of Central  banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010  Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 6
57 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 6 of 
28
58 „Another reason why central banks need to unwind their intervention in financial markets is that they are not immune 
to credit risk. The conventional rule is that central bank lending must be fully collateralised. Unsecured lending is a 
risky art, requiring discretion, which is incompatible with the principles of transparency and equal treatment in access to 
central bank credit. Nor is it consistent with the accountability of the central bank.” See H Hannoun  “The Expanding 
Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank for International Settlements Publications 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 9
59 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 6 of 
28
A restricted application of the lender of last resort facility (as much as possible) is not only justified 
on the basis  that  moral  hazard could occur – since banks or financial  institutions  experiencing 
financial difficulty will almost always expect to be bailed out when such a need arises (and hence 
will be induced to take greater levels of risks than the case would have been if no such facility had 
existed). It is also argued that “the sustained bloating of their balance sheets means that central 
banks  still  dominate  some  financial  market  segments  thereby  distorting  the  pricing  of  some 
important  bonds  and  loans,  discouraging  necessary  market-making  by  private  individuals  and 
institutions.”60
Should  lender  of  last  resort  arrangements  be  granted  to  a  wider  extent  under  complementary 
arrangements which support recapitalisation schemes than those which support guarantee schemes 
or vice versa?
Lender  of  last  resort  arrangements  should be granted to  illiquid systemically relevant  financial 
institutions  in emergency situations.This  is  partly attributed to  the fact  that  Paragraph 6 of  the 
Recapitalisation Communication, interestingly, provides for “problems of financial institutions
facing insolvency as a result of their particular business model or investment strategy.“
Other reasons why the lender of last resort facility should be used for emergency situations and 
systemically relevant institutions in particular,  are attributed to the role played by central  banks 
during the recent crisis – during which the role of central banks “in stepping in to replace disrupted 
and dislocated funding markets”61 was highlighted. In drawing attention to such developments, the 
need to avoid dependency on the central bank – to the extent that it does not become the “lender of 
first resort” (whenever the markets reveal signs of impeding financial failures), is also emphasised.62
Given the scale of government intervention and State rescues which occurred during the recent 
crisis –as well as the prominence accorded to measures aimed at preventing and limiting distortions 
of competition, calls have been made for competition authorities to take on more formidable roles in 
designing and implementing exit strategies. In order to foster competition as much as possible, it is 
proposed that ”governments should provide financial institutions with incentives to prevent them 
from depending on government support once the economy begins to recover.”63 Such incentives, it 
is further argued, could assume the form of rescue measures having conditions built into them – 
conditions  which  would  induce  financial  institutions  to  opt  for  private  sources  of  investments 
(rather than public sources of investment) when economic conditions return to normal.64
According to key findings published by the OECD, the design of competition policies in banking 
within several jurisdictions in Europe has undergone substantial reform at national level – with very 
60 H Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 7
61 „During the crisis, central banks had to step in to replace disrupted and dislocated funding markets. Severe tensions in 
interbank, foreign exchange swap and some segments of securities markets – including, lately, government bond 
markets – hampered the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The usual relationship between key policy rates and 
the rates applicable in the real economy was disrupted, and the main tool for influencing financing conditions in the real 
economy did not work properly.” ibid
62 ibid at page 9
63 Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development, „ Competition and the Financial Markets” at page 10 
64 An example is provided where governments could make it un lucrative for beneficiaries to rely on public capital 
injections any longer than they have to – by imposing restrictions on them (restrictions such as escalating dividends or 
interest rates). At some point, it is further argued, private sources of equity will become more desirable; see ibid
unprecedented changes occurring over the last two decades.65 
The recent crisis has also witnessed unprecedented levels of intervention – in terms of government 
intervention. The OECD'S findings also highlight the fact that competition authorities around the 
world have also been compelled to participate in these actions for reasons other than those related to 
intense time pressure for action, - whilst questions relating to the application of competition policy 
to the financial sector have arisen.66 
Whilst the findings highlight the controversy generated by some who argue that competition rules 
should be suspended for the duration of the crisis - thus allowing regulators to focus only on the 
objective of safeguarding the stability of the financial system, it concludes that whether competition 
is  desirable  at  all  when  there  is  a  systemic  crisis,  is  a  matter  which  generally,  is  in  need  of 
clarification.67 
E. Conclusion
In addition to other points which have been considered and addressed in this paper, it  could be 
argued  that  the  Banking  Communication  gives  greater  prominence  to  the  goal  of  promoting 
financial stability than competition concerns through: i) its requirement of general support measures 
which have to be „well-targeted in order to be able to achieve effectively the objective of remedying 
a  serious  disturbance  in  the  economy“68,  ii)  its  objective  of  providing  guidance  on  the  criteria 
relevant for the compatibility with the Treaty of general schemes as well as individual cases of 
application of such schemes and ad hoc cases of systemic relevance”, as provided for within section 
1 paragraph 5 of the Banking Communication. Whilst the Banking Communication also accords a 
respectable degree of its content towards highlighting the need to minimise factors which could give 
rise  to  competition  concerns,  the  Recapitalisation  Communications  could  be  argued  to  accord 
greater prominence to safeguards aimed at minimising and preventing distortions of competition.
The rationale for central bank and government intervention through lender of last resort facilities 
and State rescues respectively, is justified where safeguards exist to ensure that such intervention 
does  not  induce  increased  levels  of  risk  taking  or  result  in  undue  distortions  of  competition. 
Through  its  provision  in  section  2.3  paragraph  44  of  the  Recapitalisation  Communication,  the 
European Commission has taken a huge step in its efforts to ensure that moral hazard is discouraged 
, undue distortions of competition minimised – whilst providing life lines to systemically relevant 
financial  institutions  whose  problems  are  attributed  to  “inefficiencies,  poor  asset-liability 
management or risky strategies”. Such life line is provided „on the condition of either a bank's 
winding-up or a thorough and far-reaching restructuring, including a change in management and 
corporate  governance  where  appropriate.“  In  drawing  a  distinction  between  “the  treatment  of 
illiquid but  otherwise fundamentally sound financial  institutions” (where  viability problems are 
exogenously induced and also related to extreme conditions which prevail in the financial market), 
and the treatment of financial institutions whose endogenous problems are related to inefficiency or 
excessive risk- taking, such a distinction is geared towards the objectives of:
65For example, in Italy since December 2005 competition policy in banking is no longer enforced by the Bank of Italy 
but rather by the competition authority as in all other sectors. In the Netherlands, the Competition Act of 1998 applies to 
the banking sector, but only since 2000. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition 
and the Financial Crisis” at page 12
66ibid at page 13
67“Others have instead emphasised the importance of applying strict competition rules in the current crisis as a means of 
ensuring a level playing field and a coordinated reaction to the crisis – as well as avoiding a futile race for subsidies 
between countries to attract depositors and investors. Moreover, the long-term effects of relaxing competition policy can 
be serious. Mergers that lead to very concentrated markets in particular are almost impossible to reverse.”; ibid
68See paragraph 15 of the Banking Communication
1) Remedying a serious disturbance in the economy;
2)  Ensuring  that  measure  is  proportionate69 to  the  challenge  faced,  not  going  beyond  what  is 
required to attain this effect; and
3) designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill over effects on competitors, other sectors 
and other member states.”
 - in line with the general principles which constitute the basis of State aid rules of the Treaty 
(Article 87 EC Treaty and Article 107 TFEU (ex Article 87 EC Treaty).
69According to paragraph 38 of the Commission's Communication on Recapitalisation “The extent of behavioural safeguards 
should be based on a proportionality assessment, taking into account all relevant factors and in particular, the risk profile of 
the beneficiary bank. While banks with a very low risk profile may require only very limited behavioural safeguards, the need 
for such safeguards increases with a higher risk profile. The proportionality assessment is further influenced by the relative 
size of the capital injection by the State and the attained level of capital endowment.”
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